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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the member governments of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) set aside the loosely-structured organization that had administered the GATT since it
began operations in 1948, and in its place they created a formal
international organization called the World Trade Organization
(WTO). 1 One of the most important features of the new WTO
was a new procedure for adjudicating legal disputes - in GATT/
WTO parlance, a "dispute settlement" procedure. Unlike the
relatively informal GATT dispute settlement procedure that preceded it, the new WTO 2 procedure was set out in a detailed
agreement known as the "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" (DSU). Although
1. The agreement establishing the WTO is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, contained in the official text of the
package of agreements concluded at the end of the 1994 Uruguay Round.
GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, THE LEGAL TEXTS 5, 5-18 (1994);

33 I.L.M. 1140, 1140-52 (1994).

2. To date, many legal commentators, including the author, have used the
clumsy term "GATT/WTO" to describe the new dispute settlement procedure
created by the Uruguay Round agreements, in recognition of the fact that WTO
is merely an organizational shell wrapped around the legal obligations of the
GATT and its "Codes" (side agreements), and that new dispute settlement procedures themselves are based on Article XXIII of the GATT agreement. In the
long run, however, it is inevitable that simplicity and economy will prevail, and

that the procedure will become known as the "WTO procedure." The usage in
this article bows to the inevitable, saving the term "GATT/WTO" for phenomena that span the two institutions in time.
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the DSU followed the basic elements of the earlier GATT procedure, it significantly expanded the procedure's legal powers.
The DSU gave governments an automatic right to bring their
legal complaints before a dispute settlement tribunal, it made
legal rulings by tribunals automatically binding upon the parties, it introduced appellate review, and it gave complaining parties an automatic right to impose retaliatory trade sanctions in
cases where the defendant government failed to comply with
legal rulings.
The creation of the new WTO dispute settlement procedure
was viewed as a signal event in international legal affairs - the
birth of an important new legal institution that seemed to have
unusually effective powers to regulate an important area of government economic policy. Because of the potential surrender of
sovereignty involved, the new adjudication procedure was understandably controversial. In recognition of that fact, governments were careful to limit their commitment by scheduling a
review of the entire procedure after just the first four years of its
operation. 3 It was a bold initiative. The world then stepped
back and waited to learn whether it would work.
This Article seeks to evaluate the operation of the new WTO
disputes procedure during its first three years of operation. The
essay is divided into three parts. Part I begins by describing the
foundations that had been laid for this new procedure by the
GATT dispute settlement procedure that came before it - foundations that were critical to its adoption and that will be an essential part of whatever success it has. Part II then presents a
quantitative analysis of the 98 "cases" that were brought during
the first 3.3 years of operation, seeking to measure the changes
in the nature of WTO litigation brought about by the new procedure. Part III concludes by examining a number of proposals for
change, both large and small, that governments are likely to
consider either in the formal "review" that the WTO began conducting in late 1998 or in the more distant future.
I. THE BACKGROUND: FROM GATT TO THE DSU
There has been an explosion of scholarly writing about the
WTO's new dispute settlement system, much of which has given
3. Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Ministerial Decision
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 1, at 465.
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a misleading impression about the foundations of this new legal
instrument. In seeking to call attention to the significant legal
advances made by the new WTO procedure, writers have tended
to overstate the difference between the new procedure and its
GATT predecessor. To accentuate the legal rigor of the new procedure, they have tended to portray the earlier GATT procedure
as an essentially diplomatic instrument directed toward promoting negotiated settlements of legal conflicts. 4 This is a natural
mistake, because during the first thirty years of GATT history,
roughly 1948-1978, the GATT disputes procedure did exhibit a
distinctly diplomatic character. Its operating procedures were
quite ill-defined, its legal rulings were written in vague language that suggested more than it said, and both its procedures
and its rulings left plenty of room for negotiation. In 1970, the
artful ambiguity of this early GATT procedure led this author to
christen its methods "A Diplomat's Jurisprudence."5 Unfortunately, the tendency to describe the GATT procedure solely in
terms of these early characteristics completely ignores a major
change that occurred in the last fifteen years of GATT's existence. After 1980, the GATT dispute settlement procedure transformed itself into an institution based primarily on the authority
of legal obligation. The GATT procedure's transformation into a
more "judicial" or "juridical" instrument was not only remarkable in its own right, but more important to our present subject,
the development of these legal powers and their general acceptance by GATT governments laid the essential foundation for
even stronger legal powers that followed under the WTO.
The GATT agreement rose from the ashes of the failed 19461948 negotiations to create an International Trade Organization
(ITO). 6 GATT was a temporary trade agreement that was
meant to be absorbed into the ITO. When the ITO was abandoned in 1950 after the United States failed to ratify it, the
GATT found itself standing alone, forced to administer its code
of legal obligations with only a very primitive organizational
structure. During the first decade of GATT operations, GATT
4. In order to indicate the explosion of scholarly writing about the new
WTO dispute settlement system, the Appendix to this article contains an ex-

tended bibliography of writings about WTO dispute settlement during the past

four and a half years or so. The view of GATT dispute settlement as a procedure more diplomatic than legal is reflected, in varying degrees, in many of
them.
5. See Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat'sJurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615, 615-16 (1970).
6. See generally WiLLIm DIEBOLD, JR., THE END OF THE ITO (1952) (a
classic description of the demise of the ITO).
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member governments slowly and quietly developed a procedure
of third-party adjudication, based on the very skeletal provisions
of GATT Article XXI. 7 Known as the "panel procedure," it
called for legal disputes to be submitted to panels of three to
seven GATT delegates from neutral countries who would issue
legal rulings on the merits of the complaint.
Due in large part to a hostile political climate in many leading GATT countries at this time, the GATT's early adjudication
process was wrapped in layers of diplomatic vagueness and indirection. But despite its lack of precision, the procedure worked
rather well. Governments understood the legal rulings implicit
in its vaguely-worded decisions, and once these rulings were approved by the GATT Contracting Parties, defendant governments almost always felt it necessary to comply.8 The reason
these impressionistic half-decisions were successful was that the
GATT Article XXIII provides:
Nullification or Impairment
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified
or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of this Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting
parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of
the type described in paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may
be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them, and
shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider
matter, as appropriate ....
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action,
they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine
to be appropriate in circumstances....
8. Article XXIII:2 did give the Contracting Parties the power to authorize
the complaining party to impose trade sanctions against legal violations, but
this power was employed only once in GATT history, and even then the sanctions were not actually imposed. See THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Netherlands Measures of Suspension
of Obligations to the United States, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32-33 (1953).
7.
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early GATT of the 1950s was essentially a small "club" of likeminded trade policy officials who had been working together
since the 1946-1948 ITO negotiations. They all knew what they
had meant to say in the General Agreement (even if they hadn't
always said it clearly). Thus they did not need a very elaborate
decision-making procedure to generate an effective consensus
about what particular governments were expected to do. Ultimately, of course, this rather delicate procedure worked because
GATT's member governments wanted it to work. No matter
how hostile the political climate back home, the key government
leaders nonetheless wanted to be able to resolve conflicts in this
more-or-less objective, rule-based manner rather than having to
negotiate political solutions to every difference that arose. 9
After posting an impressive record in the 1950s, the GATT
dispute settlement procedure suddenly ceased being used in the
decade of the 1960s. This legal "time out" was caused primarily
by radical changes in the GATT's membership during these
years, chiefly the replacement of small European states by the
European Community and the dramatic increase in the number
of developing country members. The European Community
needed legal breathing space for some of the special trade arrangements that had been necessary to its formation. At the
same time, both the Community and GATT's other developedcountry members were even less eager to adjudicate the long
agenda of legal claims being put forward by an increasingly aggressive Group of 77. Suddenly, the conventional wisdom of
GATT was that lawsuits were a nonproductive way to approach
any problem.
During the decade of the 1970s, GATT governments began a
rather slow return to the dispute settlement practices of the
past. The primary reason was an increased concern about the
proliferation of non-tariff trade barriers. The only way to regulate most non-tariff barriers was to write general rules defining
the kinds of regulatory measures governments were and were
not permitted to employ, and then develop adjudication procedures to enforce those rules. Under prodding by the United
States, the panel procedure was dusted off and made to operate
again. In 1979, its "established" operating practices were rediscovered and written down in an agreed text, and litigation activity began to increase again.
9.

See generally ROBERT E.

TRADE DIPLOMACY

(1990).

HUDEC, THE

GATT

LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
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At first, the GATT panels appointed in the 1970s tried to
follow the nuanced diplomatic style of adjudication practiced in
the 1950s. But the conditions of the 1970s were no longer receptive to that approach. The "club" of the 1950s was gone, and in
its place was a much more contentious membership of over
eighty nations, represented by a new generation of trade policy
officials for whom the GATT/JTO negotiations were ancient history. Meanwhile, political leaders in national capitals had begun to pay greater attention to GATT legal affairs, on the one
hand questioning its assertion of legal authority over their trade
policies, and at the very same time demanding more aggressive
prosecution of GATT legal claims against others. The more
these often contentious GATT legal proceedings fell under the
political spotlight, the more difficult it became for panels of
GATT diplomats to "finesse" their way to an acceptable conclusion in important legal disputes.
The inadequacy of the diplomatic approach was demonstrated rather vividly in a few embarrassingly poor decisions
rendered in the late 1970s and early 1980s.10 In contrast, a few
well-reasoned legal rulings at this time received a favorable reception from governments. 1 The GATT Secretariat recognized
that, in this new and more difficult setting, the dispute settlement procedure would need to rely more heavily on the authority of "law" itself. Accordingly, over the next several years the
Secretariat persuaded governments to accept the addition of a
legal staff to the Secretariat. And over the next decade, the new
legal resources enabled the panel procedure to produce a string
of quite sophisticated legal decisions resolving a number of very
10. See generally Robert E. Hudec, The Role of the GATT Secretariatin the
Evolution of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, in THE URUGUAY ROUND
AND BEYOND 101, 101-20 (Jagdish Bhagwati and Mathias Hirsch, eds.) (describing the problems of the old diplomatic methods and the development of the Secretariat's legal capacity during this period). Among the several cases criticized
during this period, the chief targets were the following: United States: Income
Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 98-114 (1977); European
Community: Program of Minimum Import Prices (MIPS), Licenses, Etc. for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 68-107
(1979); Spain: Measures Concerning Domestic Sale of Soybean Oil, GATT Docs.
L/5142 and L/5142/Corr.1 (June 22, 1981), not reprinted in B.I.S.D.; United
States: Imports of CertainAutomotive Spring Assemblies, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th
Supp.) at 107-28 (1983).
11. Among the decisions that received particular commendation were: Canada: Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), GATT,
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140-68 (1984), and United States: "Manufacturing
Clause" in U.S. Copyright Legislation, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 74-94
(1985).
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sensitive trade policy disputes. These successes stimulated governments to bring more legal conflicts to the GATT, with an
ever-increasing degree of difficulty and political sensitivity. As
it dealt with this growing caseload, the dispute settlement sysof GATT law
tem also began to develop the substantive content
12
in a series of forward-looking legal precedents.
By the end of the 1980s, GATT had developed its dispute
settlement procedure into a quite powerful legal instrument. In
the decade as a whole the GATT procedure disposed of some 115
legal disputes, and by the end of the decade the annual volume
of complaints was almost double that level. As the cases became
more and more difficult, the number of failures increased, but at
the end of the decade over 80% of the cases were still being successfully disposed of.13 To be sure, that rate of failure would cer-

tainly have been unacceptable for most advanced domestic legal
systems. For an international legal institution, however, it was
remarkably successful. Most important, it was successful in the
view of the governments which participated in it. Indeed, the
best measure of the success of the GATT disputes procedure by
1990 was the increasing number of complaints governments
chose to bring before it and the increasing political sensitivity of
the trade practices it was being asked to rule upon. (Although
the success rate did drop rather sharply once the new WTO pro1990s, that proved to be
cedure had been agreed to in the early
14
mainly a transitional phenomenon. )

12. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993) (discussing

the rapidly improving fortunes of GATT dispute settlement during the 1980s).
13. The data supporting the calculation of the GATT's success rate during
the period 1948-89, with particular emphasis on the period 1980-89, can be
found in Chapter 11 and the Appendices of HUDEC, id. For the somewhat surprising decline in the success rate after GATT governments had drafted, but not
yet adopted, the new WTO procedure, see infra note 14.
14. By the end of 1990, governments had already reached agreement to
adopt the stronger WTO dispute settlement procedure. The author's provisional data for the period 1990-1995 show that in the last 29 GATT panel rulings issued during this period, 12 were not adopted, including 6 of the last 9
rulings. It was as though, having committed themselves to a procedure with no
veto escapes, governments felt entitled to enjoy one last orgy of veto indulgence,
like one last pack of cigarettes. Students of why governments comply with international legal norms will note that, in this situation, the certain arrival of a
new and better legal system in a few years had deprived vetoes (noncompliances) of their usual harmful consequence - impairing or destroying the utility of the legal system in the future. These were "free" vetoes. Once the WTO
system started operations, the vetoes stopped.
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Notwithstanding the relative success of the GATT disputes
procedure during the 1980s, its formal structure remained almost as flimsy as it had been in the 1950s. To be sure, the basic
outline of the procedure had been written down in 1979, and a
few procedural roadblocks, like selecting panelists, had been
overcome (at least in theory). 15 But the procedure was still entirely voluntary. Every decision from beginning to end had to be
made by consensus. This meant that the defendant had a virtual right to veto every step of the process, from the appointment of a panel to the adoption of the panel's legal ruling and
the authorization of trade sanctions for noncompliance. (Without adoption the ruling was not legally binding.) For most observers, this veto power was a glaring weakness in the GATT
disputes procedure. Today, most writings about the new WTO
procedure lay heavy stress upon these shortcomings when comparing the new procedure to the old GATT dispute settlement
procedure.
There is another side to this procedural flimsiness, however,
and it is that side that I wish to stress in this Article. The point
is that, at least up through 1990, the procedural weaknesses of
the GATT procedure did not really have all that much impact on
its overall success. Although the procedure was not compulsory,
defendant governments almost always decided to cooperate with
it. They did so under the pressure of a strong community consensus that every GATT member should have a right to have its
legal claims heard by an impartial third-party decision-maker.
Likewise, just as in the 1950s, the pressure to comply with legal
rulings seemed to be felt for all legal rulings, whether or not the
defendant had vetoed formal adoption of the ruling. Although
compliance was not always forthcoming, the pressure to comply
was almost always there once the community arrived at a consensus that the ruling was correct. As for the power to veto the
15. The 1973-79 Tokyo Round negotiations produced two documents outlining the panel procedure. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT B.I.S.D (26th Supp.) at 21029 (1980). In addition, most of the "codes" (side agreements) negotiated in the
Tokyo Round had their own dispute settlement procedures, each modeled
closely on GATT Article XXII, but usually with a few added details and in some
cases minor improvements.
In 1984, the problem of an impasse over the selection of persons to serve as
panelists was addressed by a decision authorizing the Secretariat to create a
roster of approved panelists (seldom used) and authorizing the Director General
to appoint panelists on his own authority, at the request of one panelist, if the
parties could not agree on the composition of the panel. See Dispute Settlement
Procedures, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 9-10 (1985).
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authorization of trade sanctions, that hardly mattered at all, because there were almost no requests for permission to employ
trade sanctions. 16 As in the 1950s, the ruling seemed to be
enough.
The natural question at this point is to ask how the GATT
disputes procedure could have accomplished so much when it
had no legally binding enforcement powers. The short answer is
that these successes occurred because of the political will of governments which wanted to have a working legal order in this
area. Governments wanted to have effective restraints on every
government's behavior, including their own. They wanted a system of restraint based on rules agreed to in advance and then
applied to individual problems by neutral and objective adjudication. We expect such views from smaller countries, which
usually believe they will fare much better under a rule-based
system than they will in a world of ad hoc negotiations where
power dictates outcomes. But the GATT's two largest superpowers -

the United States and the European Community 17 -

also

wanted this kind of regulatory system. The perspective that
leads large countries to want rule-based regulatory systems is
quite complex, but for present purposes it will suffice to cite four
advantages. A rule-based system is the most resource-efficient
way to resolve conflicts with other countries. A rule-based system is also the most effective way to negotiate and capture desired policy changes in achievable incremental steps. A rulebased system creates the most predictable conditions for business decisions. Finally, a rule-based system helps to cement
one's own liberal trade policies against the internal political
pressures of protectionism.18
The first lesson to be drawn from this story is that, contrary
to the impression being given by much of the writing on the subject, the impressive new WTO procedure is not a new departure.
In the last fifteen years of its existence, the GATT dispute settlement system had become an adjudication procedure built solidly
16. To be sure, trade sanctions were threatened with some frequency.
Such threats, as well as inflated warnings about the possibility of trade sanctions, have always been a useful argument in domestic political debate.
17. Until sometime in the early-to-mid 1980s, the European Community
could have been described as resisting the development of an effective dispute
settlement system, but with its decision to become an active participant, the old
GATT system entered its most successful period.
18. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1309-36 (1971) (discussing the last point, sometimes referred to as a policy of "lashing oneself to
the mast").
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on the authority of legally binding obligations. Much of new procedure laid down in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding is merely a repetition of operating practices already
established less formally by the GATT procedure. And far from
repudiating that earlier GATT procedure, the new WTO procedure used the former's legal success as a foundation on which it
could build an even more "legal" institution.
This first lesson is most important in defining the way one
looks at the new WTO procedure. Rather than focusing entirely
on the new departures, one should also be looking for the continuities with the past. Many things, perhaps most, are being
done the way they were done before. Even if some of those old
ways will have to change over time, one will not be able to understand the present and future shape of the WTO procedure
without a good working knowledge of the system that went
before it.
A second lesson that can be drawn from the relative legal
success of the mature GATT disputes procedure is that an international legal system does not require rigorously binding procedures to be generally effective. Given the requisite political will
to conduct affairs under a rule-based system, governments can
achieve reasonable levels of compliance without such formal
rigor. The GATT dispute settlement of the 1980s is solid proof of
that proposition.
A third lesson suggested by the GATT's experience is that
political will is really more important than rigorously binding
procedures - that strong procedures by themselves are not
likely to make a legal system very effective if they do not have
sufficient political will behind them. More specifically, it may be
suggested that the new WTO procedure is not likely to be significantly more successful than its GATT predecessor unless the
adoption of this reform is supported by significantly stronger
political will on the part of leading WTO governments. When we
ask whether or not the new system will work, therefore, we have
to begin by asking what kind of political will stands behind it.
The current fascination with the novel WTO procedures tends to
obscure the importance of this first and most important condition of success.
What can be said today about the political will behind the
new WTO system? Based on first impressions, the answer
should begin on a note of skepticism. Today's WTO governments are the same governments, more or less, as the ones that
stood behind the old GATT disputes system. While those gov-
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ernments did achieve a level of compliance that was exceptional
by international standards, their commitment was not strong
enough to deter occasional outbreaks of noncompliant behavior,
particularly among its leading citizens. The new WTO system
asks for a stronger political commitment because it sets the bar
higher. Yet it is difficult to identify any major changes in national political life in the major WTO countries that will make
their political systems more receptive to WTO legal discipline
than they were in the decade or two before the WTO came into
being. 19
Are these first impressions too pessimistic? Can it not be
argued that the willingness of governments to sign these
stronger new procedures is evidence of the fact that they are
now more willing than before to accept the discipline of a
stronger legal system? The governments surely knew that the
new WTO disputes procedure would be imposing a much
stronger discipline upon them, and governments do not normally sign such commitments unless they believe that they are
able to perform them.
Alas, the story of how the Uruguay Round dispute settlement reforms came to be adopted does not support these more
optimistic expectations. At the beginning of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round negotiations, GATT governments initially decided
to settle for some minor procedural improvements in the GATT
disputes procedure. The decision was made in December 1988,
as part of an "early harvest" of negotiating results. 20 The "early
harvest" decision on dispute settlement did seek to improve the
system by providing that the steps to formation of a panel would
be essentially automatic (codifying what was already all-but-established practice). But on the key issue of the veto power, governments once again declined to abridge the consensus principle
that gave the losing party the opportunity to veto adverse rulings. The sentiment at the time was that dispute settlement
worked better on the whole if defendant governments participated on a voluntary basis, and that it would not be productive
to try to force governments into adjudicatory rulings they were
not prepared to accept voluntarily. At this point in December
19. Viewing political developments in the United States from this perspective, the author would say that the most visible change in U.S. political conditions since the Uruguay Round has been movement in the opposite direction an apparent strengthening of the opposition to international economic institutions on the part of the political Left in the United States.
20. See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61-67 (1990).
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1988, one could say that it was the considered opinion of leading
GATT governments that there had been no significant change in
the political will of most GATT member governments.
Less than twelve months later, however, GATT governments had changed their minds. The immediate precipitating
event was the considerable intensification of a United States law
calling for the imposition of unilateral trade sanctions against
other GATT members whenever the United States determined
they were in violation of their GATT obligations or, at least,
were behaving in an unreasonable manner toward U.S. trade.
This type of vigilante justice, associated with Section 30121 of
the basic U.S. trade law, was dramatically expanded by major
trade legislation enacted in 1988.22 The 1988 trade law created
a new "Super 301" and several other "Special 301s" for a new
and larger list of wrongs against U.S. trade. The other members
of GATT viewed the new legislation as extremely threatening
and called a special session of the GATT Council to demand a
change of U.S. policy. 2 3 In reply, the United States sought to

justify its actions by complaining that GATT dispute settlement
was too slow and too weak to offer adequate protection of United
States trade interests. The U.S. argument laid particular stress
on the veto power created by the rule of consensus decisionmaking.
This United States counter-attack against the procedural
weaknesses of the existing dispute settlement system led other
governments to propose a deal. In exchange for a U.S. commitment not to employ its Section 301-type trade restrictions, the
other GATT governments would agree to create a new and procedurally tighter dispute settlement system that would meet
U.S. complaints. Although the United States was unable to
guarantee it would never-ever use 301-type sanctions, it was
willing to accept a legal obligation prohibiting such sanctions,
and with that caveat accepted the deal. 2 4 Within a year of the
21.
U.S.C.
22.
(1988),

Section 301, Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2041 (1975), as amended, 19
§ 2411.
Section 1302, Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1176
19 U.S.C. § 2402. The law expired in 1992, but the Executive Branch

still follows its procedures in form.
23. See GATT Doc. C/163 (1989).
24. The U.S. commitment is recorded in DSU Article 23, which requires
that government action based on legal complaints against other WTO members
must abide by the rules of the DSU. The United States made clear that it was
not promising to dismantle the first half of the Section 301 procedure, under
which private citizens are given a right to have their complaints heard and
evaluated publicly by the government, because that is merely an internal proce-
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"early harvest" decision, negotiators had reached agreement on
the basic elements of the new WTO disputes procedure.
The significant element in this story, of course, is the suddenness with which GATT governments abandoned the wellconsidered position stated in their "early harvest" decision the position that governments were not ready for a dispute settlement system that went beyond the voluntary GATT model.
Was it because they suddenly discovered that their fellow governments were ready, after all, to comply with a more rigorous
procedure? The events precipitating this change of view suggest
to the contrary. Rather, the change of position seems to have
been a choice between two evils - between an almost certain
legal meltdown if the United States were to carry out its new
Section 301 instructions, and a very serious risk of legal failure,
in the somewhat more distant future, if GATT adopted a dispute
settlement procedure that was more demanding than governments could obey. In these circumstances, the fact that GATT
governments chose the latter option does not mean that they
were confident it would work. There is a general rule in diplomacy (and probably in all human affairs) that when choosing between evils, the evil in the more distant future is to be preferred.
The choice in such cases is similar to the choice made by the
condemned prisoner who promised to teach the King's favorite
horse to talk in exchange for a six-month reprieve. In the words
of that prisoner, "Who knows? The horse may learn to talk."
The suggested conclusion, then, is this: If it is true that the
key ingredient of international legal systems is the political will
of member governments to comply with them, and if it is also
true that the WTO legal reforms do not signal a sudden improvement in the less-than-perfect political will that caused the
GATT legal system to suffer occasional failures, it follows that
the new WTO legal system cannot expect to have one hundred
percent compliance, even with its new and more rigorous procedures. To the contrary, it must be anticipated that there will be
defeats when governments cannot, or will not, comply with some
legal rulings - just as they did under GATT.
What this means is that, after celebrating its considerable
initial success during its first three years or so, the new WTO
legal system will have to learn to cope with legal failure. Just as
dure for making decisions about what claims to pursue. As for the Article 23
pledge not to employ unilateral trade retaliation, the U.S. has suggested an
understanding that its obligation is in the nature of a pledge to concede the
GATT/WTO illegality of such behavior.
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GATT did, it will have to learn how to get up off the floor, brush
off its soiled authority, and move on to the next piece of business
with the same high expectation of achieving compliance. In the
meanwhile, it will have to learn to treat the failed legal ruling
with persistence, patience and practicality - the persistence of
keeping the matter on its agenda, the patience of doing so for
what may be a long period of time, and the practicality of fashioning eventual accommodations that produce a result that can
be said to be consistent with long-term respect for GATT/WTO
law.

II.

25

A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF WTO OPERATIONS

It is evident that the volume of dispute settlement proceedings has increased dramatically under the WTO. The most conservative method of counting the number of legal proceedings
initiated during a particular period is to count the number of
government measures that have been made the target of one or
more legal complaints. In this Article, we shall refer to each
such proceeding as a "case." (The WTO Secretariat calls them
"matters.") Based on the records kept by the WTO Secretariat,
we find in the 3.3 years from January 1, 1995 to May 8, 1998
that 98 government measures have been the subject of one or
more dispute settlement complaints, for an average of 29.7 such
"cases" per year. 26
25. The paradigm example of "hanging on" to a case until it can be resolved
is the celebrated DISC case that lasted from 1972 to 1984. For a detailed description of the case, see Hudec, supra note 10. A footnote to that long story is
the fact that, after fourteen years, the European Community has filed a WTO
legal complaint against the U.S. statute that was passed in order to "comply"
with the GATT ruling in that case, and a panel has been established to hear the
case. See WTO Secretariat, United States - Tax Treatment of "ForeignSales
Corporations," WT/DS108/1 (Nov. 28, 1997) (complaint dated November 18,
1997).
Another example might be the 1991 and 1994 Tuna/Dolphin rulings
where, after seven years, the governments involved were finally able to negotiate a viable program of dolphin protection that resulted in removal of the
GATT-illegal U.S. trade restrictions. See Deidre McGrath, Note, WritingDifferent Lyrics to the Same Old Tune: The New (andImproved) 1997 Amendments to
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 7 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 431, 431-68
(1998).
26. All the quantitative data for WTO dispute settlement operations from
1995 to 1998 are based on the data contained in the WTO Secretariat's Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (May 8, 1995) <http://www.wto.org>
[hereinafter "Overview"].
The "Overview" for 8 May 1998 counts only 95 "matters" or "cases." My
analysis of the complaints listed by the Secretariat yields the number 98, and
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In the last 14 full years of the GATT dispute settlement system (1980-1993), the volume of cases was increasing at a steady
rate, but at a much lower level of volume. According to the author's own statistics, 27 for the five years 1980-84, the rate was
9.2 cases per year. For the five years 1985-89, the rate was 12.8
cases per year. For the four years 1990-93, the rate was 15.8
cases per year. 28 Projecting the rate of increase that occurred
during the 1980-93 period, the normal volume of GATT cases for
the years 1995-1998 should have been about 19 complaints per
29
year.
In sum, the volume of cases during the first three years of
the WTO disputes procedure is almost 90 percent greater than
the highest volume ever achieved by the GATT disputes procedure - the volume achieved during the last four full years of
normal GATT operations. The volume of WTO complaints is
about 60 percent higher than the old GATT procedure would
have achieved if its caseload had continued to increase at the
rate of the past 14 years. Measured either way, the increase in
volume has certainly been large enough to be considered a sig30
nificant event.
that is the number used in this Article. Because of the way the Secretariat's
data is organized, it has not been possible to reconcile the discrepancy.
The "Overview" is updated regularly. At the time that final revisions of
this essay were being made, the Overview of 23 September 1998 showed 107
separate "matters," and 143 individual "complaints," instead of the 95 and 131
in the 8 May 1998 "Overview." The volume figures for the May-to-September
period are consistent with the data used in this essay.
27. The statistics for the complaints filed in the years 1980-89 are published in ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 273-355, 367-608 (1993). To
adjust for the slightly different criteria used by the WTO Secretariat in defining
a "matter" or "case," I have reduced my count of GATT "cases" in the 1980's
from 115 to 110. The case count from 1990-93 is based on my as yet unpublished research extending my earlier data study to this period, adjusted to the
Secretariat criteria.
28. The count for this final GATT period is based on only the first four
years, because in the year 1994 dispute settlement activity almost ceased entirely once it became clear that the WTO would come into force in January
1995. Only 7 complaints were filed in 1994.
29. The rate of increase from 1980-84 to 1985-89 was 39%. The rate of
increase from 1985-89 to 1990-93 was 23%. To make the projection as conservative as possible, I have projected the rate of increase for 1995-98 at 20%, or an
increase from 15.8 cases per year to 19 cases per year.
30. Measured by workload, the increased caseload in the first three years
of the WTO procedure was considerably more dramatic. According to WTO Secretariat calculations made with the aid of the "word count" function of the
WordPerfect word-processing program, the number of words in the "Findings
and Conclusions" sections (the legal analysis) in the panel reports produced by
all WTO panels during the two and one half years from 1 January 1996 to 2
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The explanation for this increase in volume that most readily comes to mind is that governments have more confidence in
the new procedure because it promises to be more effective in
removing trade restrictions, and thus governments are more inclined to use it.
Another, parallel explanation that also seems fairly obvious
is that the WTO agreements concluded in 1994 at the end of the
Uruguay Round contain many more legal obligations than the
1947 GATT and its "Codes" (side agreements) - not only many
new legal obligations regarding trade in goods, such as the
TRIMS, SPS, Agriculture and Textiles agreements, 3 1 but also
legal obligations in two very large "new areas" that were not covered at all by GATT 1947, namely the GATS agreement 3 2 covering trade in services and the TRIPS agreement 3 3 covering
intellectual property rights.
The following two sections test these two possible explanations for the increase in the WTO's volume of dispute settlement
business. A third section examines the data on the number of
WTO cases that result in the appointment of panels and panel
rulings.
A.

THE IMPACT OF THE NEW OBLIGATIONS

As a base for analyzing the increase in the volume of WTO
dispute settlement cases, we have tried to express the increase
in dispute settlement activity as a finite number of cases - the
number of cases by which the cases brought under the new WTO
disputes procedure during the first 3.3 years (98 cases) exceeded
July 1998 (the first WTO panel reports appeared in 1996) were equal to the
number of words produced in the Findings and Conclusions sections of all
GATT panel reports in the ten years from 1986 to 1995. The staggering increase in the number of words is due partly to the greater complexity of WTO
cases, but also to the tendency to write more elaborate and comprehensive analyses due to the binding nature of panel decisions and the prospect of appellate
review. Actually, confining the comparison to Findings and Conclusions sections understates the increase in pages, because the "Descriptive" part of panel
reports (detailed summaries of the facts and arguments-of-the-parties) have expanded at an even faster rate. Participants and observers who groan under the
weight of 400-to-500 page reports will need no further proof that this is true.
31. Respectively, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agreement on Agriculture, and Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. All are reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 1.
32. General Agreement on Trade in Services, reprintedin RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 1.
33. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 1.
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the number of GATT cases that would have been brought during
those 3.3 years if the annual volume of GATT cases during 19901993 had simply been maintained, without allowing for any increase (52 cases). The result (98 minus 52, or an increase of 46
cases) is a conservative estimate of the number of additional
cases generated under the new WTO disputes procedure. The
question to be examined in this section, then, is how many of
these 46 additional cases can be attributed to the new obligations added in the Uruguay Round.
In the 98 WTO cases brought during the first 3.3 years, one
can identify 20 cases based on new legal obligations that could
not have been brought under the 1947 GATT:
34

10 cases brought under the TRIPS agreement,
35
3 cases brought entirely under GATS,
4 cases involving agricultural export subsidies or3 6tariffication commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture,
34.
1. Japan - Measures Concerning Sound Recordings, WTIDS28 and
41 (by US).
2. Pakistan - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticalsand Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS36 (by US).
3. Portugal - Patent Protection under the Industrial Property Act,
WT/DS37 (by US).
4. India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural
Chemical Products,WT/DS50 (by US).
5. India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS 79 (by EC) (classified as a separate
case due to separation in time).
6. EC (Ireland) - Measures Affecting the Grant to Copyright and
NeighboringRights, WT/DS82 and 115 (by US).
7. Denmark - Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, WT/DS83 (by US).
8. Sweden - MeasuresAffecting the Enforcement of IntellectualProperty Rights, WT/DS86 (by US).
9. Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/
DS114 (by EC).
10. EC (Greece) - Enforcement of Intellectual PropertyRights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs,WT/DS124 (by US).
35.
1. Japan - Measures Affecting DistributionServices, WT/DS45 (by

US).

2. Belgium - Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory
Services, WT/DS80 (by US).
3. Canada- Measures Affecting Film DistributionServices, WT/DS/
117 (by EC).
36.
1. EC - Duties on Imports of Cereals (Grains,Rice), WT/DS9, 13, 17
and 25 (by Canada, US, Thailand and Uruguay).
2. Hungary - Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural Products,
WT/DS35 (by Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Thailand and US).
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review of obligations under the
3 cases involving dispute-settlement
37
Textiles agreement.

There are also 10 other cases brought under the new SPS and
38
TRIMS agreements (8 under the SPS and 2 under TRIMS),
but these cases, although made easier to win by the new agreements, could have been brought under GATT.
Taken as a percentage of the 46 additional cases generated
under the WTO procedure, the 20 cases clearly attributable to
new obligations account for 43% of the increase. If only 3 of the
10 other cases brought under the SPS and TRIMS agreements
were in fact generated by those new obligations, we could conclude that half the increase was due to the effect of new or expanded obligations.
An interesting datum in this collection of 30 "new obligation" cases is that almost all of them were brought by the United
States. Subtracting the four cases brought against the United
States (all three Textiles cases and one SPS case), the United
Canada - MeasuresAffecting the Importationof Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, WT/DS103 and 113 (by US and New
Zealand).
4. EC - Measures Affecting the Exportationof Processed Cheese, WT/
DS104 (by US).
37.
1. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-MadeFibre Underwear, WT/DS24 (by Costa Rica).
2. United States - MeasuresAffecting Imports of Women's and Girls'
Wool Coats, WT/DS32 (by India).
3. United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses, WT/DS33 (by India).
38. SPS Cases:
1. Korea - Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of Agricultural Products, WT/DS3 and 41 (by US).
2. Korea - Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of Products,WT/DS5
(by US).
3. Australia - Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, WT/
DS18 (by Canada).
4. Korea Measures Concerning Bottled Water, WT/DS20 (by
Canada).
5. Australia- MeasuresAffecting the Importationof Salmonids, WT/
DS21 (by US).
6. EC - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26 and 48 (by US and Canada).
7. Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76 (by
3.

US).
8. United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products,
WT/DS100 (by EC).
TRIMS Cases:
1. Indonesia - CertainMeasures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS54, 55, 59 and 64 (by EC, Japan and US).
2. Brazil - Certain Automotive Investment Measures, WT/DS51, 52,
56, and 81 (by Japan, US and EC).

MINN

J

GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 8:1

States was the complainant or co-complainant in 22 of the remaining 26. 39 On reflection, this concentration of complaints is
not too surprising. The United States had expended by far the
most effort to broaden GATT to include these new categories of
legal obligations, so it is only logical that the United States
would have been first in line to harvest the investment.
There is one other kind of "new obligation" that appears to
have been a significant cause of the 46-case increase. Under the
"Single Undertaking" principle adopted in the Uruguay Round
negotiations, developing countries were required to sign almost
40
every agreement included in the WTO package of agreements.
In addition, developing countries were asked to bind most of
their tariff schedules, even if at relatively high "ceiling bindings." Both the volume of these new obligations and the interest in stronger discipline that lay behind them promised that the
volume of WTO enforcement activity against developing countries would increase.
In a later section of this Article, 4 1 we examine the percentage of WTO cases brought against developing country defendants, compared with the percentage of earlier GATT cases
brought against developing countries. The data tend to confirm
the hypothesis that tightening developing country legal obligations was another significant source of the increase in WTO litigation. The data suggest that as many as 25 of the 46 additional
cases brought in the WTO from 1995 to 1998 were due to an
increase in the number of cases being brought against developing countries. Indeed, if the figure of 25 additional cases is correct, the increase in cases brought against developing countries
would be a slightly larger cause of increased litigation than were
the many new WTO obligations.
Added together, the cases based on new obligations (at least
20 cases) and the increase in the number of cases brought
against developing countries (25 cases) would almost equal the
overall increase experienced by the WTO disputes procedure in
39. See cases cited supra notes 34-38.
40. There were only two major exceptions for most developing countries.
First, developing countries were not required to join the four "Plurilateral
Agreements," found in Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization - those involving trade in civil aircraft, government
procurement, trade in dairy products and trade in bovine meat. Second, full
implementation of certain obligations were postponed for periods of up to ten
years, under the heading of Special and Differential Treatment. There was another more generous set of exceptions and special advantages for Least-Developed Developing Countries (LDDCs).
41. See infra section II.B.2.
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its first 3.3 years (46 cases). Since there is very little overlap
between the two categories of cases -only three of the 20 "new
agreements" cases were against developing countries 4 2 - there
is a strong case for saying that substantially all the increase in
WTO litigation can be traced to the new or intensified obligations of the Uruguay Round.
B.

THE IMPACT OF STRONGER PROCEDURES

The hypothesis that stronger procedures will elicit more dispute settlement complaints is intuitively persuasive, and in the
absence of other explanations would seem a plausible explanation for a general, across-the-board increase in complaints activity by all parties. To find more probative evidence that stronger
procedures have influenced the volume of complaints, one would
look for a demonstration that the stronger procedures have induced governments to bring certain cases that would not have
been brought under the weaker old procedure. Unfortunately,
there is no easy way to make that judgment about individual
cases.
The one general measure that would appear to have some
probative value is the relative economic and political power of
the countries that are responsible for this growing number of
complaints. It is generally assumed that smaller and weaker
countries are reluctant to bring legal complaints against larger
countries, and that weak procedures accentuate this reluctance
because they allow larger countries to apply "muscle" in response to unwelcome complaints. Accordingly, weak procedures
should generate a lower-than-normal share of complaints by
small countries. Without pausing to debate what volume would
be "normal," one can postulate that an increase in the percentage of complaints filed by smaller countries - and particularly
by developing countries - would be fairly persuasive evidence
that stronger procedures have made a difference.
The following sub-section tests this hypothesis by examining the identity of the complainants responsible for the large volume of WTO complaints in 1995-1998. It then compares them
with the group of complainants that were responsible for GATT
complaints during the last fifteen years of the GATT's existence,
1980-1994. After that, for what it may be worth, the next sub42. Two of the TRIPS cases were against India and one other TRIPS case
was against Pakistan. Of the 10 other SPS and TRIMS cases, 3 of the 8 SPS
cases and both of the TRIMS cases were against developing countries. See
cases cited supra note 38.
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section identifies the countries who were the defendants in the
WTO cases and compares them to the group of defendants in the
earlier GATT cases.
1.

The Identity of the Complainants.

In order to count the distribution of legal complaints filed by
different groups of countries, each complaint filed by each individual country has to be counted as a single event, even when
one or more other complaints have been filed against the same
government measure. In this sub-section, therefore, we shall be
dealing with a body of 134 individual WTO complaints filed from
1995 to 1998, and a body of 216 GATT complaints filed from
3
4
1980 to 1994.

Which countries were responsible for the large increase in
the number of WTO complaints as compared to the volume of
earlier GATT complaints? The overall answer is that both developed and developing countries seem to have increased their
complaints activity more or less equally. The four major groups
of complainants are (1) the United States, (2) the European
Community and its member states, (3) the "other" developed
counties including Japan and smaller developed countries like
Canada and Switzerland, and (4) the developing countries. The
following comparisons can be made between the shares of complaints during the last 15 years of GATT dispute settlement
(1980-1994) 44 and the shares under the first 3.3 years of WTO
dispute settlement.
COMPLAINANTS

United States
European Communities
Other Developed Countries
Developing Countries

GATT 1980-1994

WTO 1995-1998

26%
19%
25%
31%

32%
22%
16%
31%

These gross numbers show the combined U.S. and EC share of
complaints increasing by 9 percentage points, the share of
"other" developed countries declining by about 10 percentage
43. The sources for the following data are: For GATT 1948-1989, see supra
note 27; for GATT 1990-1994, the author's unpublished research extending his
previous study, and for the WTO 1995-1998, see supra note 26.
44. The seven GATT cases for the year 1994 have been included in the complainant-defendant data.
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points, and the share of developing countries staying exactly the
same.
It could be argued that the data for developing country participation in the last 15 years of GATT dispute settlement is
misleading because there was an atypical bulge in the volume of
developing country complaints during the 1990-1994 period,
when developing country complaints accounted for 44 percent of
all complaints (39 of 89), as opposed to a 22 percent share during
the decade of the 1980s. Upon closer investigation, however, the
increase in developing country complaints during the early
1990s does seem to have reflected a more or less permanent
surge in developing country legal activity. In order to adjust for
the possible overstatement of the level of dispute settlement activity by developing countries, due to the occasional tendency of
developing countries to file multiple-party complaints with five
to ten complainants, I have recalculated the data by counting
only the "cases" brought by one or more developing countries,
instead of counting each complaint by an individual government
as a separate unit. Using this alternative measure of cases filed,
one sees a sharp upturn in the developing country share of cases
in the early 1990s, followed by an almost equal share of cases
brought under the WTO procedure. One finds that developing
countries were responsible for 17 percent of the GATT cases filed
from 1980-89, 32 percent of the GATT cases filed in 1990-94, and
33 percent of the WTO cases filed from 1995-98. 4 5 Whatever it
was that stimulated this near doubling of developing country
legal complaints since 1990, it was something that happened
before the DSU came into force.
Thus, although it seems quite probable stronger dispute settlement procedures did induce a somewhat greater volume of
complaints activity by all kinds of countries, that incentive does
not seem to have had a significantly greater effect on smaller
countries than it did upon the larger and more powerful countries. The most one can say is that the stronger procedures
probably helped to induce developing countries to keep pace
45. The numbers are: 19 of the 110 "cases" filed in 1980-89, 23 of the 71
"cases" filed in 1990-94, and 32 of the 98 "cases" filed from 1995-98 ("case" being
defined according to WTO Secretariat criteria). The data on individual complaints for the 1980s is distorted by one case in which 10 developing countries
were plaintiffs. The data for the early 1990s was distorted by three cases in
which 19 developing countries complained. Interestingly, the data for the WTO
cases from 1995-98 is distorted slightly in the other direction, due to the fact
that developed countries started filing many more multiple complaints during
this period, slightly more than were filed by developing countries.
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with the expanding complaints activity in developed countries.
Compared to the pronounced influence of the new and expanded
obligations created by the Uruguay Round - an influence primarily upon developed country complainants 46 - the stronger
disputes procedures appear to have played a less prominent role.
2.

The Identity of the Defendants.

Since there is usually only one defendant for each "case,"
the distribution of defendants has been calculated on a per-case
basis. This makes it possible to ask which defendants account
for the 46-case increase in the volume of WTO litigation.
Against which countries were this very large number of
WTO cases brought? So far, dispersion of defendants under the
WTO disputes procedure has been significantly different than it
had been under the GATT disputes procedure in the 15 years
from 1980 to 1994. The following comparison can be made:
DEFENDANTS

GATT 1980-1994

WTO 1995-1998

United States

36%

21%

European Communities
Other Developed Countries
Developing Countries

28%
22%
13%

20%
20%
39%

The significant datum, of course, is the three-fold increase in the
percentage of cases brought against the developing countries.
This represents a significant part of the 46-case increase in the
number of WTO complaints. If the developing country share of
GATT cases filed (13%) had remained constant during the first
3.3 years of the WTO disputes procedure, only 13 of the first 98
WTO cases would have been filed against developing countries.
The actual number of WTO cases against developing countries
was 38. The increase of 25 cases is more than half of the total
increase of 46 cases. The increased number of cases against developing countries, therefore, has to be viewed as a cause at
least as important as the new obligations contained in the Uruguay Round agreements, both accounting for about half of the
increase in WTO cases.
To repeat, the apparent reason for this very large increase
in cases brought against developing countries was the major effort, launched in the Uruguay Round, to bring about a signifi46.

See supra text accompanying note 40.
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cant increase in legal discipline against developing countries.
This explanation is not contradicted by the fact that more than a
quarter of the WTO cases brought against developing countries
during this period were filed by other developing countries (10 of
38). To be sure, it was the developed countries which led the
Uruguay Round effort to strengthen the legal discipline against
developing countries, and thus the developed countries would
logically have been first in line to enforce this new discipline.
But unlike the case of the specific new obligations like GATS
and TRIPS that were mainly of interest to developed country
complainants, the general legal disciplines undertaken by developing countries were general trade obligations of interest to all
countries. Thus, once developing countries had actually undertaken the new legal obligations pushed upon them in the Uruguay Round, the existence of those obligations would naturally
act as an inducement to all potential complainants, developing
countries as well as others.
The parallel decrease in the percentage of complaints
against the developed countries is less significant than it might
appear. It actually represents an almost 50 percent gain in the
absolute number of complaints brought against developed countries each year - from about 13 complaints per year during the
1990-94 GATT period to about 18 per year under the 1995-1998
WTO. Neither the United States nor the European Community
has lost its attractiveness as a potential defendant.
C.
1.

THE FREQUENCY OF PANELS AND PANEL RULINGS

What percentage of WTO cases have been submitted to
panels?

In the last period for which good data is available - the
years 1980-89 - about 53% of all GATT cases proceeded to the
stage of appointing a panel. 47 To arrive at a comparable figure
for the WTO cases, we have examined only the 84 cases filed up
to January 1, 1998 - excluding all more recent complaints because most would not have had enough time to reach the point
47. Here, as in earlier parts of this Article, to adjust for the slightly different criteria used by the WTO Secretariat in defining a "case," I have reduced my
count of GATT "cases" in the 1980s from 115 to 110, with a corresponding reduction in the number of panels from 62 to 58 and the number of panel rulings
from 47 to 43.
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in the process when panels are typically appointed. 48 Of these
84 cases, only 37 - about 44 % - have resulted in the appointment of a panel. It is possible that one or two slowly developing
cases might add additional panels to this sample, raising the total to about 45-46%. In sum, so far a somewhat smaller percentage of WTO cases have been carried to the stage of appointing a
panel.
At first, this datum is somewhat surprising. One might
have anticipated that, with the greater automaticity of the new
WTO procedure, it would be easier for complaining governments
to obtain the appointment of panels, and thus one would see
more rather than fewer panels being appointed.
Two different hypotheses can be offered to explain the lower
rate of panel formation in WTO cases. First, it may be that the
binding quality of the new procedure has persuaded more governments to remove illegal practices voluntarily. If so, one
would have to conclude that the new procedure is working better
than its predecessor. To test this hypothesis, one would have to
study carefully the actual results in those cases that do not proceed to a panel, because not all withdrawn complaints have
happy endings. Tracking down results in these cases is a very
difficult and time-consuming kind of research. It is, however,
critical to measuring the success or failure of the dispute settlement procedure, since it involves the outcome of at least half the
complaints filed. That work has not yet been done.
The second hypothesis to explain the lower rate of panel formation is that a greater number of governments are using legal
complaints as a negotiating instrument - a device to increase
pressure without really intending to carry the litigation any further. This tends to happen whenever a large number of dispute
settlement proceedings have been filed. The existence of many
legal proceedings tends to render the ordinary language of diplomacy somewhat less forceful by comparison, with the result that
governments need to raise the level of their voice (i.e., file a legal
complaint) in order to be heard and listened to in the other country's capital. This phenomenon can be viewed as a sort of multiplier effect, a process by which a larger volume of lawsuits tends
to generate yet an additional number of false lawsuits that
makes the increase in legal activity look larger than it is. Once
again, only a detailed study of results in non-panel cases can
48. The excluded cases are the cases after WT/DS115. The 84 cases included in the sample have been tracked to the most recent data available in the
September 23, 1998 "Overview."
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explain what is happening in this potentially important half of
dispute settlement proceedings.
2.

What percentage of WTO cases have led to a panel ruling?

Going back to the data for the 1980s, we find that 39% of the
GATT cases filed during that decade resulted in a panel ruling.
Based on data available at the time of writing, so far the 84
WTO cases filed up to January 1, 1998 have produced only 19
panel rulings, or only 23%.
This datum is misleading, however, because there are still
14 panels outstanding, and a substantial number of these are
almost certain to produce rulings. Also, one or two of the cases
from this sample that are still in consultation may yet produce
panels and rulings. The final number of rulings is likely to be
between 27 and 30 - in other words, 33-36%. The comparison
between this projected number and earlier GATT practice
reveals about the same degree of difference, the percentage of
rulings in WTO cases being slightly lower. The difference is
equally surprising. Its explanation would involve testing the
same two hypotheses.
III.

THE OPERATION OF THE NEW PROCEDURE:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A.

THE APPELLATE BODY

Evaluation of the new GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure invariably begins with the work of the Appellate Body.
The idea of creating an Appellate Body emerged rather late in
the Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute settlement, after
governments had outlined the main elements which made panel
rulings automatically binding. Having decided to accord this
much power to panel rulings, governments then felt the need to
provide a stronger safeguard against the possibility of erroneous
rulings. The Appellate Body was created primarily to provide
this added assurance of legal correctness. Whether intended or
not, however, the decision to create an Appellate Body has also
caused a pronounced shift in the center of power in the GATT/
WTO legal machinery. In the previous GATT panel proceedings,
the decisive influence had generally rested with the legal analysis performed by the GATT Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs. 49 Under the present GATT/WTO procedure, the Appellate
Body now has the final word on all issues of law. In its first
49.

See Hudec, supra note 10, at 114-20.
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three years, the Appellate Body has made full use of these
powers.
As most observers expected, all but a handful of adverse
panel rulings have been appealed to the Appellate Body. The
Appellate Body has affirmed the result in all but one of its first
twelve appellate rulings, 50 but it has wielded a sharp knife
when reviewing the supporting legal analysis by which panels
have justified those results. Although the parties disadvantaged
by Appellate Body rulings can be heard grumbling in private
about the substance (and sometimes the style) of the rulings
against them, so far governments have observed what seems to
be a collective cease-fire against all public criticism of Appellate
Body decisions during its start-up years.
The Appellate Body has constructed a well-functioning institution in a very short period of time. Contrary to the informal, ad hoc procedures often followed by GATT panels, the
Appellate Body set out fairly detailed rules of procedure right at
the outset. It also made clear that it expected a fairly high standard of practice, as compared with the more easy-going standard
of practice common to party-controlled panel proceedings. It insisted on thorough written submissions from the parties appearing before it, as well as representation by counsel able to answer
extensive questioning by the three-member panel assigned to
the case.
The Appellate Body also acted rather decisively in solving a
problem that had been created by the DSU rule that calls for the
seven-member Body to sit in rotating panels of three to hear and
decide appeals. Given that membership on the Appellate Body
was supposed to be a part-time position, with only part-time residence in Geneva, this rotating pattern of decision-making
looked as though it would create obstacles to the development of
unified answers to legal questions. In response, the Appellate
Body adopted a "collegiality" policy requiring that all seven
members assemble in Geneva after the hearing in each case to
50. Two cases did not really count because they involved only an appeal by
the winning party as to collateral legal issues. Of the other ten, nine affirmed
the main substantive conclusions that were challenged on appeal. The only decision to reverse the panel decision entirely was the so-called LAN (Local Area
Networks) case in which the Appellate Body reversed a panel finding that an
EC tariff concession covered certain computer equipment, finding that the
panel's analysis had mistakenly focused on only the exporter's expectations as
to the meaning of the concession, and had improperly allocated the burden of
proof on the importing country. European Communities, United Kingdom and
Ireland - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62,
67 and 68/AB/R (June 5, 1998) (appealed by EC).
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discuss the case with the three-member panel deciding it. Thus
far, all three-member Appellate Body opinions have been unanimous, and the "collegiality" policy at least gives the impression
that all seven members were in agreement with the general outlines of each decision.
Appellate Body opinions have called for more detailed and
more rigorous legal analysis than GATT panels had been accustomed to performing. Although its own appellate opinions are
obviously much shorter and more narrowly focused, the Appellate Body opinions do appear to apply the same standards to
themselves. It is too early to offer any judgment about the substantive quality of these first dozen Appellate Body decisions.
That judgment will require a collection of careful, candid analyses of particular decisions by qualified professionals, a process
that will take a few more years to attain the necessary volume.
There should be no trouble in finding willing critics; a small
army of academic lawyers and well-published practicing lawyers
are already gathering around the Appellate Body's work product, with sharpened pencils in hand.
In the meanwhile, one must be content with a few observations about the general direction of the Appellate Body's first
dozen decisions. As noted above, in most cases the Appellate
Body has identified some legal errors in the panel's supporting
analysis, often fairly extensive errors, but it has rarely reversed
the ultimate result reached by the panel. A tentative hypothesis
would be that the Appellate Body is inclined to respect the practical judgment of the trade policy officials who serve as panelists, and in particular their overall judgment about whether the
particular conduct being complained of deserves community
sanction. As time goes on, it will be interesting to observe
whether this hypothesis proves to be an accurate predictor. The
normal expectation, one would suppose, is that the Appellate
Body will become more assertive over time, as its members acquire stronger convictions as to both WTO law and policy.
From the beginning, the Appellate Body has made a point of
insisting that interpretation of WTO agreements be made in
conformity with the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 51 The care and attention
given to the VCLT (now dutifully echoed and amplified in most
panel reports) could be viewed as a bit excessive, given the
rather open-ended drafting of VCLT Articles 31 and 32 and the
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 in 8 I.L.M. 679
(The American Society of International Law, 1969).
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differences among scholars as to what they mean.5 2 In defense
of this practice, however, it must be remembered that the WTO
dispute settlement procedure is facing a difficult task of obtaining government compliance with its new and more demanding rules - a task which is more difficult than it appears
because, as noted in Part I, the rigor of this new procedure has
reached a bit beyond the legal discipline WTO governments actually thought they were ready for. In this situation, a normal
measure of prudence would dictate giving legal rulings the
greatest possible appearance of objective legal authority. Claiming that results are called for by the VCLT's carefully codified
principles of customary international law is the first thing any
rational tribunal would do in these circumstances.
One of the most widely noticed statements by the Appellate
Body in this first round of decisions was its citing with approval
the principle of in dubio mitius in the Hormones case. 5 3 In reversing the panel's conclusion that Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement created a prima facie obligation to comply with certain
international sanitary standards, the Appellate Body said,
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose
upon themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome,
obligation by mandating conformity or compliance with such [international] standards, guidelines and recommendations.

A footnote to this sentence cited the following passage from Oppenheim's InternationalLaw:
The principle of in dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in deference to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party
assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial
and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions
upon the parties.

The principle of in dubio mitius is a well respected canon of
treaty interpretation, but like most canons (and counter-canons)
its role in treaty interpretation is a matter of how forcefully it is
52. For a discussion of the various views of the VCLT and the larger debate
over the proper principles of interpretation generally, see SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 114-19 (2nd ed. 1984). Commenting on
O'Connell's criticism that the VCLT is too general, Sinclair replies,
The criticism directed towards the generality of the rules is no doubt
well founded if (but only if) the intention had been to formulate a comprehensive code of the canons of interpretation available to international tribunals or other decision-makers. But the [International Law]
Commission specifically disavowed any such intent ....
53. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),WTO Doc. WT/DS 26/AB/R, WT/DS 48/AN/R at 41-42 (Jan. 16,
1998).
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applied. Given the expected difficulty in securing government
compliance with the new WTO disputes procedure, one might
expect that the Appellate Body would give considerable emphasis to this canon, in an effort to assure governments that the
WTO's new and stronger enforcement powers would be limited
to obligations that governments have clearly and knowingly
adopted. Until the Hormones case, however, the Appellate Body
decisions had not gone out of their way to give this assurance.
The earlier decisions did not seem to have been significantly
narrowed by explicit application of in dubio mitius reasoning.
Observers will be watching to see whether the Hormones decision and the more recent LAN decision 5 4 may be signs of a move
in this direction. Given the prospect of some difficult compliance
problems on the horizon, some further movement in this direction would not be unlikely.
On the whole, the substance of the first dozen Appellate
Body decisions rendered during the first three years has been
viewed by governments as competent, conservative, and "responsible." The net effect has been that the Appellate Body has
secured, in practice, the authority it was given on paper in the
Uruguay Round reforms. WTO legal practice now has its eyes
firmly focused on what the Appellate Body has said and on what
the Appellate Body is likely to do in the future. Although the
next few years will undoubtedly produce a substantial body of
literature criticizing some of these early rulings, that criticism
will almost certainly not threaten the central role that the Appellate Body has succeeded in defining for itself. In all the discussions of future reform that the author has heard or read to
date, the existence of the Appellate Body is simply taken for
granted.
What changes could be proposed in order to improve the
working of the Appellate Body? From the viewpoint of the Appellate Body itself, the two most useful changes would probably
be the obvious ones - more resources (more staff) and more
time than the 60 days it is currently given to decide appeals.
The major structural issue likely to be raised is the question
whether the Appellate Body should be given the power to remand incorrect decisions to panels for further proceedings,
rather than following its present practice of trying to resolve
such cases itself on the basis of the existing record.
54.
European Communities, United Kingdom and Ireland - Customs
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62, 67 and 68/AB/R
(June 5, 1998).
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Given the present level of satisfaction with the work of the
Appellate Body, the author would not expect that the formal
WTO review scheduled for late 1998 would consider more than a
few incremental changes in the present structure and practice of
the Appellate Body. Any change involving an extension of the
total time allowed for dispute settlement proceedings is likely to
meet strong resistance from those who feel that the procedure
must continue to meet the original U.S. demand that WTO procedures be as rapid as its own Section 301 proceedings. If and
when the new WTO dispute settlement procedure becomes more
firmly rooted, however, both the remand power and some additional time would deserve serious consideration.
B.

THE PANEL PROCEDURE

The changes made by new WTO dispute settlement procedure have had a great impact on the work of the three-member
panels that hear and decide legal complaints at the first level.
Even without appellate review, the automatically binding nature of WTO panel reports means that panels must take greater
care to produce demonstrably competent, well-reasoned, and
well-supported decisions. The fact of review by the Appellate
Body intensifies these demands, giving panels the further task
of complying with all of the guidelines set down by previous Appellate Body decisions. The burden of meeting these increased
quality standards has been still further increased by the tendency of governments to submit increasingly more complex
cases to the new disputes procedure - cases requiring analysis
of both more facts and more legal issues than the typical GATT
panel ruling of a decade ago. One very visible sign of these new
demands has been a staggering increase in the length of panel
reports under the WTO procedure in comparison to the panel
reports of the GATT procedure it replaced.5 5 The pressure of all
this added work is then further compounded because, unlike
previous GATT panel proceedings, the new WTO proceedings
must be completed within rigorous time limits (although more
complex cases still manage to take considerable extra time).
All of these new elements place the participants under considerably more pressure than was previously the case under the
rather relaxed work habits and procedures of GATT panels.
Secretariat officials, who are responsible for assembling "the record" of facts and arguments as well as providing legal research
55.

See supra note 30 discussing increase in word count.
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and drafting services, must carry much of the increased load,
leaving the Secretariat feeling continually short-handed despite
a substantial increase in staff at the beginning of WTO operations. The increased demands of the new WTO procedure also
require more of panel members, both in terms of the quality of
decisions being made and the amount of time and involvement
that must be invested in the task.
All these new demands on panels have generated concern
about whether the panel procedure, as presently designed and
operated, is the most suitable vehicle for performing its present
responsibilities.
1.

Is a first-tierpanel procedure still necessary?

Logically, the first question is whether the panel procedure
is even needed now that there is a body of essentially full-time
professional judges sitting in the Appellate Body. Most international adjudication takes place at one level. The fact that the
Uruguay Round negotiators chose a two-tier model does not
mean that the negotiators seriously considered and rejected a
one-tier model. Rather, it was simply that governments had
learned to accept the existing GATT panel procedure, and the
best way to build a stronger system was to build on what governments had already accepted. So, taking the existing system for
granted, the negotiators confined their task to making those
changes in the existing procedure that would achieve the specific
goals they had in mind. Creating the Appellate Body was the
easiest and least disruptive way, in those particular circumstances, to meet the need for a greater assurance of legal
correctness.
Logically, now that the Appellate Body is securely established and functioning well, the WTO governments should probably ask themselves whether they really want a two-tier
adjudication system at all. The obvious alternative is to increase the Appellate Body from seven to nine members, make
membership a full-time job, and simply send all cases to the Appellate Body for decision within the 12-16 month time limit of
DSU Article 20.
As far as the author has been able to tell, at the present
time there is little or no interest in abolishing the first-tier panel
procedure. The Appellate Body itself gives no sign of wanting to
expand its role and, if asked, would probably say that it prefers
dealing with cases after another institution has cleaned out the
underbrush and narrowed the dispute to the main legal issues.
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Most other WTO participants and observers seem to take the
two-tier system for granted, focusing on how to improve the
panel procedure rather than questioning the advisability of a
two-tier procedure in the first place. Although the time is
clearly not right for such a proposal, it should be kept in mind
particularly if, as is quite possible, the present panel procedure
is deemed unsatisfactory, and it proves impossible to make
enough changes in the panel procedure itself to meet the
56
problem.
2.

The Selection of Panel Members.

Most of the concerns about the operation of the present
panel procedure stem from the perception that the WTO procedure needs greater legal rigor than before - so that it can deal
with the increased complexity of the cases being filed, so that it
can satisfy the more rigorous standards that are being applied to
its decisions by the Appellate Body, and so that its decisions will
have the legitimacy needed to justify their automatically binding character. The first issue usually mentioned in connection
with these concerns is the ad hoc, part-time nature of the panel
itself, particularly as it relates to (a) the professional qualifications of the panel members and (b) the time, effort, and control
that can be expected from panel members serving in that
capacity.
Traditionally, panels have consisted of three diplomats from
the GATT delegations of countries perceived to be neutrals in
the dispute. Panel members were usually described as experts
in GATT law. That was once true in the early days of GATT,
when Geneva delegations were staffed with the veterans of the
GATTJITO negotiations who had actually written the General
Agreement. Today's panel members are usually well-versed in
WTO policy and procedures, and are generally persons who have
a reputation for good judgment among their fellow diplomats.
But most lack the legal training or experience to render professionally competent judgments on complex legal issues. Since the
early 1980s, the majority of panel members have tended to rely
on the advice of the Secretariat's legal staff on such legal issues.
While most panel members have insisted on exercising their
56. For example, it is quite conceivable that the notoriously parsimonious
WTO governments would resist creating a new corps of professional judges,
with their own staff and institutional structure (a first-tier Appellate Body, one
might say), but would be willing to add two or more judges and some additional
staff to the Appellate Body itself, and then ask them all to work harder.
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own judgment at the end of the day, Secretariat legal advisors
have clearly exercised considerable influence.
Some critics have attacked the role of the Secretariat in this
arrangement, charging that Secretariat officials have no mandate to perform this quasi-decision-making role and are not accountable to the government community because they take no
visible responsibility for what is decided. The criticism is wellfounded, albeit the consequences are somewhat less troublesome
now that the Appellate Body has the final responsibility for the
outcome in most cases. But the criticism is also somewhat misdirected. However awkward the arrangement may be, in most
panel proceedings the Secretariat has been, and will remain, the
only available source of legal expertise as long as the panel
members are selected as they have been in the past. The only
alternative to legal rulings based on Secretariat legal advice (or
on the advice of some other equally unanointed advisors) is a
panel procedure in which the panel members themselves have
enough legal expertise to employ their own legal judgment. If
panels were composed of members with such legal expertise, one
would no longer need to worry about the undue decision-making
57
power of the panel's legal staff.
In recent years, the WTO Secretariat has sought to
strengthen the corps of panel members by repeatedly proposing
a number of veteran panelists when suggesting possible panelists to the parties. Some of these veterans can be called legal
experts, others are simply very well-respected diplomats who
understand the dispute settlement process and have demonstrated good judgment in previous cases. The effort to increase
the participation of this particular group of panel members has
met with some success, but the limitations of this strategy have
already become visible. Well-regarded veteran panelists are
limited in number. There are severe limits on the number of
cases they can handle consistent with their primary professional
occupations. And party litigants sometimes find reasons for objecting to these eminent persons as well.
Whatever the limited gain achieved by more frequent selection of well-respected veterans, many participants feel that the
problem of finding an adequate overall supply of qualified panel57. A separate concern about using Secretariat legal officers as the legal
staff for panel members is a conflict-of-interest, or a conflict-of-function problem
that occurs when Secretariat staff who have given legal advice to governments
about a particular matter find themselves, a year later, advising a panel asked
to rule upon the same or a similar issue.
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ists is actually getting worse. The demand for panel members
has increased very substantially. Even with a slower rate of
panel formation than in the past, the considerable increase in
the absolute number of WTO cases has led to an overall increase
in panel formation each year - from about seven panels per
year at the end of the 1980s to about twelve per year at present.
This means the WTO must staff thirty-six panels every three
years, which in turn means 108 panel members have to be found
every three years.
Meanwhile, the supply of panel members acceptable to governments is decreasing. About a third of the needed panel members will be able to be drawn from veteran panelists serving two
or three times every three years. A major limitation on the supply of new panelists is the general rule against appointing nationals of a disputing party or nationals of other interested
parties. To begin with, this rule excludes the rather large supply of qualified European Community and United States citizens
from a very large percentage of panels. The recent expansion of
the European Community has further reduced the remaining
list of recognized neutrals, and the accession of Switzerland to
the Community could decrease even further the small number of
recognized neutrals that are left. 58 These serious supply limitations have recently been exacerbated by the growing tendency of
governments to object to proposed panelists on the slightest
grounds. The more important WTO litigation becomes, the more
sensitive government officials seem to be about potential allegations of careless panel selection or, perhaps, the more they try to
improve a losing hand by manipulating panel selection. In the
words of one observer, "the process doesn't even warm up these
days until a dozen or more panelists have been rejected." It is
hard to find anyone who is satisfied with the current panel selection process, and most share the sense that it is getting worse
every year.
Beyond all these quantitative limitations, there is a larger
question of whether panel members of whatever qualifications
can ever be fully effective as long as their participation is limited to ad hoc, part-time service. If greater legal expertise is desired, it will not be obtained by drawing upon the available pool
of ad hoc panelists. Moreover, the entire ad hoc, part-time
58. In the first 30 panels appointed by the WTO, 12 of the 90 panelists
were Swiss. Under present neutrality rules excluding nationals of parties and
interested parties, as "Europeans" these Swiss panelists would probably not
have been selected in 10 of those 12 cases.
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structure of panel membership works against the desire for
more effective participation. Under the present design, panel
members serve only from time to time. Unless they are fully
retired, they spend the majority of their time performing their
other, primary professional duties - whether as WTO diplomats, government officials, practicing lawyers, or academics.
For the most part they work with new and different colleagues
and staff each time around. Even though there are many reasons for wanting fresh perspectives from fresh faces, these limitations exact a heavy price for that quality.
In recognition of these problems staffing panels, some critics
have proposed a more radical change, altering the basic character of panel members. The idea is to make panel members more
like members of the Appellate Body - that is, essentially permanent, well-paid professionals who will devote the major part
of their time, if not all of their time, to WTO adjudication.
Little work seems to have been done on the mechanics of
such a proposal. Few legal systems employ three professional
judges to decide cases in their first-level tribunals, and it would
seem extravagant to do so here. One professional jurist should
suffice. Based on their past behavior, governments can be expected to prefer jurists with government experience as well.
Governments might even want the somewhat greater comfort
that would come from seating the professional jurist as chair of a
three-member panel with two senior WTO diplomats. Since the
two diplomats would have two of the three votes, however, that
design would open up all the selection battles that are currently
threatening to paralyze the system.
Either way, a design calling for one professional jurist per
panel would need to define a reasonable workload in order to
determine the number to be employed. The volume of panel
business tends to be uneven, with variations in the number of
active panels at one time, in the complexity of individual cases,
and in the time demands of each case, with alternating periods
of dead time and intensive work to meet deadlines. Estimating
that there can be around fifteen panels in operation at peak
times, and guessing that three panels a year would be a fair
workload, one might estimate a minimum need for about five
professional jurists. Another one or two would not be wasted,
particularly if only a few very time-consuming "blockbuster"
cases continue to appear on the WTO docket.
Expense and the supply of candidates should not be a problem. The selection process will almost certainly be a problem.
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Indeed, if one listens to those who went through the extremely
contentious battle that was waged in selecting the first Appellate Body in 1995, there is a good chance that distaste for the
prospect of another such battle would render a professional-jurist proposal "dead-on-arrival." To be sure, this time around
governments will already have worked out the geographical and
political distribution formula they settled upon for the Appellate Body - American, European, and Japanese seats, another
seat for smaller developed countries, and three developing country seats for Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with the "owners"
of each seat exercising some degree of control over nominations
and thus, indirectly, selection. One problem with following the
Appellate Body model is that it requires at least seven seats to
satisfy the major players, and more likely eight or nine. A more
serious problem with using that model is that professional jurists at the panel level will not be making decisions in quite the
same collective manner as the Appellate Body. Consequently,
the questions of national bias raised by such a nationally-oriented selection procedure would be a good deal more acute than
they are with the Appellate Body.5 9 The proposal might not
work at all unless governments can figure out a way to nominate
and select candidates on a basis that would inspire more confidence in the neutrality of the persons chosen.
At the moment, most observers are predicting that governments will not be ready to consider a professional-jurist proposal
in the current 1998 review being carried out in the WTO. There
is a general sense that the first priority at the present time must
be to build political acceptance of the new disputes procedure.
Therefore the best line to follow at this early time in its history
is to keep declaring the system a success rather than opening it
up to major change just a few years after adopting it. Governments no doubt see the problems in the selection process, but as
long as cases processed through panels and the Appellate Body
are generally seen as successfully resolved, the pressure to act
will not yet be there.
In the author's view, the professional-jurist reform warrants serious consideration. The more one studies the various
59. One of the more interesting elements of the success of the Appellate
Body so far has been the fairly low level of concern about national bias, notwithstanding the national orientation and control of the selection process. It would
have been too much to expect no whisper of suspected bias, for losing parties
will always search for other reasons. But the collective nature of the enterprise,
coupled with the reputations of the individual members, does seem to have kept
such neutrality concerns at an acceptably low level.
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other problems with the present panel process, the more one
sees that they come back to problems centering on the panel
members - their professional qualifications and part-time participation. Although immediate action may be politically unwise, it is not too early to begin serious discussion of the
alternatives.
3.

The Standard of Practice.

WTO panel proceedings usually involve a struggle to develop the necessary information and legal understanding to decide the case properly. Each of the parties to a dispute
settlement proceeding is quite content to present the panel with
all the information favorable to its side, and will want to avoid
presenting any information that can help the other side. In ordinary civil litigation the adverse party usually manages to present the contrary side of the case. The same is true in WTO
litigation, but the panel process has certain limitations in that
regard. Governments do not have powers of discovery to obtain
information from opposing parties, and so often they can only
offer undocumented surmise. Likewise, panels themselves do
not have the time or the procedural expertise to conduct long
hearings with witnesses. The best way to develop the facts is to
obtain the parties' agreement to them. This usually requires
questioning by the panel to fill in the gaps, with questions focusing on just those facts and issues that the party being questioned would often prefer not to answer fairly and fully. Full
development of the legal side of the case often requires similar
questioning, just as judges in civil litigation find it valuable to
sharpen their understanding of legal issues by probing apparent
weak points in each party's legal arguments. To be effective,
such factual and legal questioning requires a good foundation in
the submissions of the parties, careful preparation of those
materials, and above all a certain degree of tenacity. The sooner
this is done, the more time the panel will have to refine its understanding, and the more opportunity it will have to cover
missing ground. In a time-limited proceeding, time is quality.
The present panel procedure is not structured in a way that
allows panels to develop cases in a very aggressive manner. The
Secretariat officials have an outline of a schedule and a process
they lay before the parties, but the process, which is based on
traditional practice, is not very efficient.
The complainant and defendant take about 60 days to write
and exchange first submissions, after which they participate in a
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hearing before the panel. Traditionally, the parties at the first
hearing do little more than restate their first written submissions. Little if any further elaboration is expected in oral exchanges or in questioning by the panel or by each other. The low
expectations for the first hearing tend to become self-fulfilling;
both parties and panelists tend to limit their preparations to an
introductory level. The low level of accomplishment at the first
hearing reduces the effectiveness of the second hearing a month
or so later. Cases tend to develop in ragged fashion, governed by
whatever the parties submit and when they submit it.
The lower level of expectation throughout the proceeding
tends to reduce the value of questioning by the panel. The panel
does have the possibility of questioning the parties on factual
and legal issues, but representatives of the parties are often not
prepared to answer without further instruction. Oral questioning tends to be limited to less complex subjects, with limitations
on the extent of follow-up questions. For these reasons, and also
because of a desire to make a better record, primary reliance
tends to be placed on written questions, and written questions,
of course, are easier to avoid unless they are written with great
care, and sometimes even then. In such an atmosphere, tenacity
is discouraged.
In part, this somewhat passive and slow-moving state of affairs is caused by the way that power is structured in the model
panel that the WTO inherited from GATT. The traditional view
of GATT panels centered on the idea that the panel was a body
created by the parties to help them resolve a legal dispute. In
the beginning, panels were created by agreement of the parties.
Panel members were selected by agreement of the parties.
Panels were assisted by GATT Secretariat officials, and the Secretariat always presented itself as a servant of the governments
rather than an independent body. Even though the new WTO
procedure makes the panel process compulsory, panelists are
still approved by the parties, Secretariat officials are still servants of the governments, and the governments still have the
traditional expectation of party control.
Needless to say, with this perception of the roles and relationships in a panel proceeding, it is difficult for panelists or Secretariat officials to force a higher standard of practice on the
parties. The Secretariat legal staff is perhaps best qualified to
initiate a more rigorous standard of practice, having the greatest experience in how panels operate and what they need to accomplish. Yet the Secretariat is not only the servant of
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governments, but it is also the servant of the panel, and in that
latter capacity finds it difficult to persuade the panel to do
things that may precipitate conflict with the parties. The panel
members themselves -

even the veteran members -

are still

only occasional, ad hoc participants, invited to participate with
the consent of the parties. Thus they usually find it more comfortable to follow whatever advice they are given about the usual
way of doing things. As a consequence, neither panel members
nor Secretariat advisors exert much force in guiding the development of the case.
So long as the roles and relationships of WTO panels follow
these traditional patterns, it will be difficult to impose a more
rigorous standard of practice on the panel process. It might be
possible to have the Dispute Settlement Body - the plenary
council of WTO governments acting as directors of the dispute
settlement process - set higher objectives for particular phases
of the procedure, but the success of such an initiative would still
depend on having someone in charge of the proceedings willing
and able to assert the authority to make it happen. That rather
aggressive role is not one that many senior members of the Geneva diplomatic community would seek.
It is worth pausing here to note that the Appellate Body has
been constructed in a way that escapes the "party control" model
one sees in present WTO panels. Because its members are permanent, they are free from the pressures that restrain ad hoc
panelists chosen by the parties. The staff of the Appellate Body
is their servant, but not the servant of governments. The result
of this structure is what might be called "judicial independence."
If governments want the panel process to have the control that
flows from a similar kind of judicial independence, the elements
60
of that model are already before them.
4.

The Interim Report.

A specific change in the panel procedure that has enlisted
considerable support is a proposal to delete the "interim report"
stage of the panel process. The "interim report" is the stage in
which the panel releases to the parties a draft of its findings and
60. If one were to look at the present situation of the WTO panel process
through a more theoretical lens, many of the tensions currently pulling upon
the WTO panel process could well be described as tensions caused by trying to
use a judicial institution built on a "party control" model to meet the demands
of a judicial institution built on an "independent control" model.
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conclusions on the merits of the dispute. 6 1 The interim report
procedure was adopted in the Uruguay Round reform negotiations. It was borrowed from the dispute settlement provisions of
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), and
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after it.
The purpose of the practice is to give the panel an opportunity to
receive the parties' objections to its legal ruling, so that it can
discover and correct unintended errors before releasing its report to the public. Such a procedure is particularly useful in dispute settlement procedures where one has reason to be
concerned that the proceedings before the panel may not necessarily illuminate the problem sufficiently to permit the panel to
perceive all its dimensions the first time around. In both
CUSTA and NAFTA, for example, panel members are all nongovernmental lawyers and academics who have no formal connection to the international institutions in question, the permanent Secretariat of these institutions does not offer panels any
substantive legal advice, and the panel has only one oral
hearing.
Although the interim report phase of the process has contributed to some improvement in the clarity and scope of panel
legal rulings during the three years it has been in use, a strong
argument has developed for removing it from the current procedure. Many aspects of the CUSTA/NAFTA dispute settlement
procedure that made this correction phase particularly useful do
not exist in the WTO process. First, the limitations of the
CUSTA/NAFTA panel procedure just described do not exist in
the WTO. In WTO panels, most panel members have had rather
extensive experience with WTO operations, they are assisted by
a skillful legal staff in the Secretariat, and they do go through
two rounds of hearings, and sometimes a third. Second, while
decisions by NAFTA panels are the final decisions in the process, with no further opportunity for correction, decisions of
62
WTO panels can always be appealed to the Appellate Body.
61. For a detailed argument in favor of this proposal, see Andrew W.
Shoyer, The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Observations and
Suggestions, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 277, 293-296 (1998). Article 15 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 3, provides that panels shall submit an
interim report to the parties, that the parties may request review of the report
and also a further hearing before the panel, and that the panel shall address
the parties' comments in its final report.
62. Logically, the presence of appellate review could well remove another
reason for the interim report, by discouraging the losing party from transmitting its complaints about the panel decision to the panel in the interim review
process, in the fear that the panel may find a way to correct the error without
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And third, NAFTA governments have generally been able to
keep interim reports confidential, which increases a panel's ability to make significant changes, whereas the WTO seems powerless to prevent interim reports from being transmitted
immediately to the press of the winning party.
In addition, the time consumed by the interim report phase
is costlier in the WTO procedures than it is in NAFTA. In practice, the time limits of the NAFTA procedures have been quite
flexible. WTO procedures, on the other hand, operate under relatively more strict time limits that seek to conform to the timing
provisions of U.S. Section 301. The deadlines for both the panel
process and the Appellate Body's proceedings are tighter than
they should be for effective decision-making. If the interim review procedure were abandoned, the time saved could be used to
give panels more time to prepare their final decisions, or to give
the Appellate Body more time to decide appeals, or possibly a bit
of both.
On balance, the gain in working time for WTO panels
should be worth more, in terms of improving the report, than the
opportunity provided by the interim review process. The change
should not be controversial, nor should it be threatening to public confidence in the dispute settlement procedure.
C.

TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

To date, the most forceful proposal for changing the present
dispute settlement procedure has been a proposal by the United
States to open the disputes procedure to public scrutiny and to
some degree of public participation.6 3 At present, the documents generated by panel and Appellate Body proceedings are
largely confidential. The proceedings themselves are closed to
the public, and private parties are not permitted to submit views
or information directly to panels or the Appellate Body. The proposals being advanced would do away with most confidentiality
restrictions on documents, open hearings to the public, and allow private parties to submit briefs to panels and to the Appellate Body.
changing the adverse result, thereby removing a weapon on appeal. Thus far,
however, governments do not seem to have saved their arrows in this fashion.
63. The main points of the U.S. position were set forth by President Clinton
in his address to the WTO Ministerial Meeting of May 18, 1998. See Gary G.
Yerkey, Clinton Steers Clear of New Round of Talks, Asks WTO Ministers to
Explore New Methods, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 889 (May 5, 1998).
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The United States proposals appear to have been generated
by pressure from two private sector sources. The most important comes from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), primarily those concerned with environmental issues, labor rights,
and human rights. These groups have been successful in persuading the U.S. government to employ trade sanctions to encourage foreign governments to comply with international
norms in these areas (as viewed by the U.S.), and they wish to
dissuade the WTO from ruling such unilateral trade sanctions
GATT-illegal. In their view, greater public attention will create
pressures against such rulings, as will the opportunity to present information and legal arguments to the decision-making
tribunals. At a deeper level, NGOs no doubt believe that the
recognition of their right to participate will amount to political
recognition of the relevance of the values they represent, and
thus will be another step toward greater recognition of those values in GATT/WTO legal norms.
The second source of the U.S. "transparency" and "participation" demands is the private lawyers who specialize in international trade matters. Speaking on behalf of the international
businesses they represent (although with some independent interest of their own in the new legal business that would be generated), the trade lawyers look ultimately to a time when
affected business interests will be allowed to become full parties
to dispute settlement proceedings, as they already are in
NAFTA's Chapter 19 dispute settlement review of antidumping
and countervailing duty actions. While the goal of private party
participation as litigants may not be within reach at the present
time, the "transparency" and "participation" proposals will prepare the ground for that goal. (Interestingly, these private business interests could well end up opposing the positions taken by
the NGOs who are supporting the same proposals- a situation
that would probably stimulate greater activity, and a need for
more legal representation, on both sides.)
Aggressive United States sponsorship will no doubt put
these "transparency" and "participation" proposals on the
agenda of the current WTO "review." Their consideration will
involve a debate over whether they are appropriate as a matter
of WTO policy.
With regard to the "transparency" proposals - public access to documents and hearings - the primary argument in
favor of public access involves the perceived legitimacy of the
WTO's legal process. WTO critics have charged that WTO confi-
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dentiality and secrecy constitute a "Star Chamber" decisionmaking process. To date, these charges have given WTO critics
a powerful public relations advantage. In truth, the NGOs and
private lawyers who bring these charges usually have no difficulty in finding out what is happening behind the closed doors,
for few if any litigation documents can be kept away from a really serious investigator. The charges nonetheless have carried
some weight because the public at large simply does not trust
the honesty and legitimacy of secret proceedings. This loss of
public support could have serious consequences, especially at
the present time when the WTO's new and more demanding
WTO disputes procedure must win acceptance in national
capitals.
In the past, the principal GATT/WTO policy argument in
opposition to greater transparency in dispute settlement proceedings has been that instant public exposure will lead government representatives to engage in various kinds of
"grandstanding" behavior to satisfy public demands for vigorous
advocacy. This warning conjures up visions of government lawyers, particularly those for the defendant, making every technical objection to the proceedings they can think of, trying to delay
or derail the proceedings by following "scorched earth" legal tactics. Such tactics could create serious obstacles to a panel's ability to adjudicate the dispute. They would turn the parties away
from the cooperative behavior that is often needed to compensate for the limited fact-finding power of panels, and they would
lay down a legal minefield through which panel members, being
untrained in legal warfare, would not be able to navigate without committing errors.
These concerns were not fanciful and have been considered
weighty enough to justify the preservation of confidentiality up
to the present time. The question now is whether they are still
as weighty today as they were five or ten years ago. The "Star
Chamber" accusations have put a new counterweight on the balance, one that was not there in the days when GATT legal proceedings drew considerably less public attention and much less
vigorous criticism from NGOs and others. Moreover, present
circumstances may have rendered the premise of this objection
to transparency invalid - the premise that WTO dispute settlement can continue to operate in the same friendly and cooperative manner as it did before, if only it is allowed to operate in
private. Although many panel proceedings still maintain a relatively cooperative atmosphere, in many other cases the pressure
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of increased public scrutiny has already made government legal
practice a great deal more tenacious, and tendentious, than it
was in the golden days of GATT dispute settlement. The public
attention that causes this behavior is not going to diminish. The
more the WTO accomplishes, the brighter that spotlight will become, with or without confidentiality restrictions. Therefore, instead of thinking about how to run away from the unpleasant
legal behavior caused by this public attention, the WTO should
think about how to manage it.
From what one hears of Appellate Body proceedings, the
Appellate Body may have already asserted the kind of control
over its proceedings that is needed to deal effectively with overaggressive representation. Protecting panel proceedings against
such behavior is more difficult, because panel proceedings have
more investigative work to accomplish, and because ad hoc
panels cannot be as easily focused on this task. But the comparison is still relevant. The solution lies in more rigorous control
of the proceedings.
In sum, while the proposal to allow public access to documents and hearings could well have a negative impact on party
behavior, such public access would help to deflect serious attacks on the legitimacy of WTO legal rulings. Rather than suffering continued criticism for a progressively less effective
confidentiality policy, WTO governments should accept the inevitability of less cooperative legal practice, and should deal with
the negative effects of this changed behavior by strengthening
control and management of the panel procedure.
There should be no insuperable practical problems in meeting these "transparency" demands. Protection of confidential
business information will have to be arranged, but this would
not be the first public process that needed to devise solutions to
that issue.6 4 Offering public access to hearings will create some
logistical problems of finding rooms with sufficient space, which
present WTO hearing rooms do not have. At some point, the
WTO will have to follow the practice of most domestic courts by
adopting a first-come-first-served policy toward public seating.
The "participation" demand will probably focus, in the immediate future, on the proposal to allow private parties to sub64. The cases where confidential business information is most likely to assume an important part of written submissions will be those involving "contingent protection" - antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard cases where confidential business information about both importers and the domestic
industry is often critical to the necessary findings.
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mit amicus curiae briefs containing legal arguments and other

kinds of information directly to panels and the Appellate Body.
These proposals will present a number of political and practical
policy issues.
It must be recognized that a demand for a right to appear
before an international tribunal is a partial repudiation of the
role being performed by national governments in those proceedings. Everything the private groups would say to the international tribunal can be, and usually is, communicated to their
national governments. Governments are supposed to digest that
information, choose the goals that best serve the national interest, and pursue those goals in the international litigation. By
asking for direct access, private groups are saying that something is wrong, or at least lacking, in the way governments are
performing that function. Sometimes the complaint is simply
that governments lack the resources of time and information to
do the best job of pursuing goals that are agreed. Frequently,
however, there is an underlying charge that the government is
choosing goals that do not represent the national interest. The
claim most often made by business interests is that the government's pursuit of the nation's economic interests is being unduly
restrained by concerns about more ephemeral political interests.
The case made by NGOs is often that national pursuit of environmental, labor, or human rights goals are being deflected by
economic considerations. Whatever the criticism, the claimants
will seek to characterize acceptance of their participation demand as an acknowledgment that the government policies in
question are either wrong or at least inadequate.
The demand for direct participation also says something
about the operation of the international tribunal in question. A
demand to participate in a political body is simply a demand for
representation of one's views and interests in a political process.
A demand to participate in the operations of a juridical institution implies some shortcomings in the way that it is currently
reaching decisions. The demand usually implies the same
problems - either the tribunal is not receiving enough information, or the tribunal is viewing the law incorrectly. Either way,
the premise is that current decisions are wrong and need to be
changed. And, once again, the private groups will want to characterize agreement to their demands as an acknowledgment
that the decisions complained of need to be changed.
The standard response to this sort of political claim, of
course, is that an agreement to allow participation means noth-
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ing of the kind. Especially when participation is opened to all
parties on all sides of an issue, the institution will claim that it
is merely trying to improve the general quality of its decisionmaking process by encouraging a sufficient flow of information
and argument on both sides. This is a political conversation,
however, and so logic will not necessarily determine the conclusions drawn from it. The claimants' goal is to win, not clarity of
understanding. In all probability, therefore, there is no way
that governments will be able to say "yes" without to some degree validating the claims of the proponents.
In short, the participation issue is an issue of normative
politics and not just a question of process. For governments supporting the normative goals being sought by some or all of the
private interests advancing these proposals, the attainment of
these political gains is all the more reason to support these proposals. For governments that oppose some or all of these political goals, the question is not so much whether to oppose, but
how. These proposals raise all the classic questions of whether
to reduce opposition by giving something now, and perhaps suffering more pressure later, or precipitating the conflict now.
The only thing that is certain is that this will not be the last
installment, whatever is decided in this debate.
The main practical issue raised by acceptance of an amicus
brief proposal is the problem of flow control. Some proposals
have suggested that the WTO should control the volume of submissions by requiring would-be participants to obtain advance
approval by demonstrating a legitimate interest in the proceeding or an ability to contribute something distinctive to the elucidation of the issues. Most WTO officials, including members of
panels and the Appellate Body, will almost certainly recoil at
the prospect of having to make such decisions, especially if they
share the concern about the implicit messages that such decisions would send to participants. In the author's view, the only
practicable procedure would be a "free-market" solution that allows anyone to file a brief and allows panel or Appellate Body
members to read as many or as few as they judge appropriate.
Parties and third parties will, of course, need to see everything
that is submitted, as will the general public. This will require
lots of copies and a central distribution organ to make sure that
proper distribution is carried out.
Certain private parties will probably object to a free-market
approach precisely because it would deprive them of a WTO endorsement that would come from receiving a specific authoriza-
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tion to file. But the main objection will probably come from
governments themselves. Governments that are parties to the
litigation will object that, not knowing what briefs will be read
by the panel or Appellate Body, they cannot properly defend
their interests without responding to every such submission adverse to their position, and that the burden of reading and responding to all that material will be too great. That may prove
to be a fatal objection to the whole idea. The only way to answer
this objection is to persuade governments to accept the procedure for a short trial period, and hope that private groups will
have enough sense to coordinate their activities enough to re65
duce the volume to a manageable number.
Proposals for more active forms of participation, either making oral presentations to the panel or Appellate Body or, still
better, being treated as a party to the proceeding, will almost
certainly not be approved in the near future. The first hurdle to
acceptance would be the need to control volume by selecting
among would-be participants, and that alone should be enough
to stop such proposals at the present time. In addition, governments are likely to want to see what happens with the first steps
toward participation before thinking about going further.

65. There will, of course, be certain commercial pressures working to increase the number of petitions, principally the efforts of businesses that supply
representation services to persuade clients that their interests require the protection of a formal submission.
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